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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs .
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership, and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

Case No. 880544-CA

Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The

parties

entered

Management Agreement

into

in October

a

Purchase

1985.

Agreement

and

Humphries, by

and

through counsel, sought to rescind that transaction without
the necessity of litigation.

That offer was rejected, and

Plaintiff initiated this action seeking to enforce the terms
of the Purchase Agreement, but denying
obligations

under

the

Management

liability

Agreement.

for his
Humphries

counterclaimed

and

sought

rescission

of

the

contract,

damages for fraudulent misrepresentation arising from the
Purchase Agreement, indemnification for certain obligations
assumed by Humphries on Wright's behalf, and damages arising
from the termination of the Management Agreement.
Prior to trial, the Court specifically enforced the
Purchase Agreement and the Management Agreement, ordered
Humphries paid pursuant to the Management Agreement while he
served as manager, and reserved all other issues for trial.
After

a five-day

jury trial in April of 1988, the

matter was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories.
The jury found that Wright had fraudulently misrepresented
the value of his property and awarded appropriate damages to
Humphries.

The jury also found that Wright had wrongfully

terminated Humphries as the manager, and awarded damages of
$15,000.

The jury further determined that Wright should pay

a certain $30,000 promissory note, that Humphries should pay
the

$15,000

promissory

note

addressed

in

the

Purchase

Agreement, and that Humphries was entitled to attorney's
fees in the amount of $10,000.

Finally, the jury ordered

Humphries to pay Wright certain monies used by Humphries
while in control of the nursery, which resulted in an offset
against the total amount awarded Humphries.
Post-trial, the Court took away the judgment in favor
of Humphries arising from Wright's breach of the Management

Contract, resulting in a net judgment in favor of Humphries
of $68,780.21.

The Court also denied Wright's motions for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial and
Wright thereafter appealed.
Humphries cross-appealed, seeking to have the wrongful
termination

award

of

$15,000

reinstated,

pre-judgment

interest on damages

awarding

him

for the fraud committed,

and indemnification for interest and attorney's fees as set
forth in the $30,000 promissory note which the jurv found
Wright was obligated to pay.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In addition to the issues identified by Wright in his
brief, the following issues also remain on appeal:
1.

Based on standards of appellate review, has Wright

demonstrated

that

the

facts most

favorable

to

the

trial

court's judgment are insufficient to support the judgment?
2.

Has Wright sustained his burden on appeal that the

juryfs verdict was totally unsupported by the evidence?
3.

Did

Humphries1

verdict,
which

the

the

jury

trial

court

claim

awarded

for

err

in

dismissing,

wrongful

Humphries

damages

post-

termination,
in

the

for

sum of

$15,000?
4.

Did the trial court err in ruling, post-trial, that

Humphries was not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the
damages awarded to him?
3

5.

Did the trial court err in ruling, post-trial, that

Wright was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the amounts
that Humphries was ordered to pay?
6.

Did

the

trial

court

err

by

failing

to

totally

indemnify Humphries by: (1) refusing to order Wright to pay
post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in the promissory note for $30,000; and

(2) refusing to order Wright to

pay attornev's fees and other costs reauired in said promissory note in the event of a default?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Neither Wright nor Humphries takes the position that
there are determinative constitutional provisionsf statutesf
ordinances

or rules which

control, or are applicable

inf

this matter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE NURSERY BEFORE THE SALE
Westside Nursery had been in business for a number of
years prior to October 4, 1985.

It was owned by a limited

partnership, and the premises were leased from one of the
limited

partners

(T.71-75) .

It was

located

on

the main

highway between St. George and Santa Clara, and thus had
good exposure to the traveling public.

Books and records

were maintained by the partnership, with the accounting done
by Grant Tucker, an accountant with considerable experience
(T.879-881) .
Prior to the sale of the nursery on October 4, 1985,
the books and records were made available by Humphries to
Wright

(Exhibit

additionf
Nursery
worth

Wright

dated
cf

1,

paragraph

received

July

21r

$144,433.52

9(c);

Addendum

a

balance

sheet

1985

(Exhibit

14)

(T.781).

Wright

for

A).

Westside

indicating

also

In

net

received

a

balance sheet dated September 20, 1985 showing net worth of
$140f939.03

(Exhibit

16).

Prior

to the

sale, and

in an

attempt to determine actual value, Humphries and his employees
took

an

(Exhibits
assets

as

inventory
22 and

of

23) .

identified

plant

materials

and

To this amount was added
on

the

respective

balance

supplies
current
sheets.

Therefore, the balance sheet of October 1, 1985 revised the
inventory

from $134,027.40 down to $60f000 resulting in a

net value of the nursery as per the balance sheet prepared
by the accountant in the sum of $95,536.11

(T.837, Exhibit

17, Addendum E ) .
Even after the nursery was sold to Wright, the balance
sheet

of

October

30,

1985

still

showed

inventory

of

$60,950.00, plus other fixed assets, with a net worth of
$97,828.85 (Exhibit 18) .
It has always been Humphries1 position, as the manager
and general partner of Westside Nursery, that the nursery
5

was worth $90,000

to $100,000 when he sold it to Wright.

(T.703r Exhibit 69, Addendum C, Exhibit 75, Addendum D ) .
At the time of trial, the nursery had been closed for
business for some time at Wright's election.

THE PARTIES
Humphries

met

Wright

in

the

summer

of

1985

when

Humphries assisted in the landscaping of Wright's recently
acquired home at Green Valley.

Wright had a passion for

exotic plants and thought it would be both a great idea and
a financially attractive proposal to introduce exotic plants
into the St. George area and particularly, eucalyptus trees
that

would

(T.8 6-87) .

not

lose

their

To do thatf

leaves

during

the

winter

he needed to acquire an existing

facility, so negotiations began after Wright and Humphries
developed

a friendship between themselves and their wives

(T.124-126) .
of

lovef

Humphries testified that he had a great deal

admiration

dispute arose

and

respect

(T.694-5, 698-99).

for

Wright

before

Wright had been

any

in the

real estate development business since 1957 (T.1032).

NEGOTIATIONS AND DOCUMENTS
In August of 1985, Wright flew Humphries in his private
plane, using his personal pilot, from St. George to Ogden.
Humphries spent the night at Wright's home, but Wright did

not

show

Humphries

the

Ogden

property

at

that

time

(T.82-83).
The

parties

and

their

wives

vehicle on October 2, 1985.

returned

to

Ogden

by

Wright picked up the Purchase

Agreement and the Management Agreement

(Exhibits 1 and 2,

Addendums A and B) drafted by his attorney after picking up
Humphries and his wife, but did not disclose that he had
done

so

until

October

ultimately signed
agreements

were

5,

1985

(T.91-93).
signed

when

the

documents

were

Humprhies testified that the

before

he was

shown

the

land

by

Wright (T.94).
After

signing

the

documents, the parties went

to a

local title company in Ogden where Wright signed the deeds.
Wright represented in the Purchase Agreement that title to
the property was free and clear of encumbrances and agreed
to provide at his own expense a policy of title insurance
covering

the

value

of

the

land

conveyed

(Exhibit

1,

paragraph 2(a); Addendum A ) . Humphries has never received a
policy

of title

conveyed

as

insurance

required

by

for the value of the property
the

Purchase

Agreement.

An

examination of (Exhibit 52, Addendum G) the Commitment for
Title

Insurance

dilemma.

obtained

by

Wright,

reveals

Wright's

The Commitment fails to indicate the "amount" that

the property was to be insured for in favor of Humphries.
If Wright

had directed

the title company

7

to provide

the

title insurance that he was required to provide under the
Purchase

Agreementf

and

if

he

had

Humphries1

insured

property for $90,000, then he could not take the position
that his property was worth anything less than that amount.
If

Wright

insured

the

property

for

less

than

$90,000,

Humphries would have been on notice that he had not received
property

having

nursery.

Rather than do either, Wright did nothing, and the

jury

justifiably

a value

found

of

$90,0 00

that Wright

in exchange

breached

the

for

the

Purchase

Agreement by failing to provide a policy of title insurance
insuring the value of the land conveyed, together with other
breaches of the contracts in question.
At the time Humphries received title, the property was
encumbered

by

unpaid

real

property

taxes

in

$398.06 for taxable years 1981 through 1984

the

sum

of

(Exhibit 52),

and those taxes were not paid by Wright until March of 1986,
well after the litigation was underway (T. 586) .
Prior to the time the agreements were executed, Wright
told Humphries the three acres he was going to deed to him
were worth $30,000 per acre or collectively $90,000 (T.710,
775, 776).
of

the

Simultaneously, Humphries told Wright the value

nursery

was

between

$90,000

and

$100,000

and

testified that they (meaning Wright and Humphries) had come
to an agreement on what Wright valued his property to be
worth

and what Humphries valued

the nursery

to be worth

(T.710).

Prior to the sale, Wright also told the accountant

for the nursery, Grant Tucker, that the subject property had
a value of $90,000 and did so in the presence of Humphries
(T.883) .

Wright made this statement when Tucker

thought the nursery was worth more than $90,000.
sale, Wright

told

his

employee, Chad

property was worth at least $100,000
also a good
concerned
Humphries

friend

and

cf Humphries.

voiced

it

to

said he
After the

Eskelson, that

(T.592)

the

Eskelsen was

After Humphries became

Wright,

Wright

again

told

and his wife that the property had a value in

excess of $90,000 (T.595).
After the documents were signed, the parties went to
view the property, during which Wright told Humphries that
he had been a real estate developer in Ogden and that his
subdivisions had been successful

(T.713).

Concerning

the

subject property, Humphries testified Wright told him:
"Darrel, this is the last of the property. This
is my most prime piece of ground that we have
left.
It is the last one yet to develop. And
when I finish developing this particular acreage
that I am going to be showing you, then my dream
would
(sic) have been completed for Ogden."
(T.713).
Humphries

specifically

testified

that Wright did not

tell him about any of the problems relating to the subject
property,
concerning

and
the

specifically
potential

did

not

building

might prevent future development

mention
moratorium

(T.715).

any
and

problems
how

it

Nor did Wright

make any mention to Humphries of the recent conversations he
had

had

Planning

with
and

the

representatives

Zoning

Commission.

of

the

Weber

County

On

cross-examination,

Wright admitted that he received the following information
from

the

Weber

County

officials

prior

to

the

time

transferred the property to Humphries:
1. That there existed the possibility that a
building moratorium might be enacted for the area
of the subject property and that it would affect
Wright's property (T.555-556).
2. That there had been septic tank problems
up on the hillside in the area of the subject
property resulting in elevated coliform levels in
the water; that there were some political
influences being exercised to get the area
condemned for low interest money from the state;
and that the state governmental officials had been
out and looked at the problem (T.559).
3. That there had been a group of citizens
complaining about existing problems for the area
in question (T.561).
4. That the county had been getting a lot of
pressure to close the area down which would stop
subdividing so that the county could get a lower
interest rate on needed improvements (T.56 3).
5. That the county would have to come out
and judge each parcel on a piece-by-piece basis
and that there would not be any more subdivisions
in the county wherein Weber County would give
blanket
approval
of
a
subdivision
without
inspection (T.563-564).
6. That one of the tests to be performed by
the county would be a "perc test" to see if
adequate water percolation on the land existed.
If the land didn't pass a perc testf then approval
would be denied (T.564-565, 855).

he

On
told

cross-examination, Wright

Humphries

of

the

existence

admitted
of

any

that

of

the

he

never

problems

outlined above prior to the time he deeded the property to
him (T.565-67).

Humphries confirmed that prior to the sale,

Wright did not disclose to him any of the problems outlined
above (T.715-16).
After

the

dispute

arose,

Wright

reaffirmed

his

representation to Humphries that the property had a value of
$90,000

(T.736-37).

However

on cross-examination, Wright

finally admitted that he earlier testified at his deposition
that he did not know the value of the subject property at
the time he told Humphries it was worth $90,000 (T.1032).
The building moratorium

(Exhibit 27, Addendum F) was

enacted on October 15, 1985, eleven days after Wright deeded
the property to Humphries.

WHY THE CONTROVERSY AROSE
After the parties executed the agreements and Wright
became

the owner

of

manage

it pursuant

the
to

nursery, Humphries

the Management

continued

Agreement.

to

Wright

began ordering exotic plants while attending shows in Reno
and

Louisiana

(T.124).

Humphries

began

concerning Wright's lack of integrity

to

hear

stories

(T.130, 1015-16).

By

late November of 1985, Humphries became concerned about the
value of the property in Weber County based on what he had

11

heard

about

Wright

(T.131).

He

also

became

concerned

because he had not received copies of the agreements, even
though he had requested copies from Wright four to six times
(T. 740) •

Finally, Humphries had to resort to a "cloak and

dagger" scheme to get copies by wrestling them from Wright
as he was leaving the public library (T.140-43).
As

previously

indicated,

Wright

also

breached

the

Purchase* Agreement by failing to provide Humphries with a
policy of title insurance insuring the value of the land at
$90,000, and by failing to convey the land free and clear at
closing.,
Because Humphries became concerned that he had received
property having a value far less than that of the nursery,
and after he obtained copies of the documents, he contacted
his attorney and also obtained a preliminary appraisal which
indicated
$35,000

that the property
(T.918-19).

In

an

had a value of as
attempt

to

settle

little as
the matter

short of litigation, Humphries had his attorney send Wright
a letter, certified mail, dated December
Wright

refused

December

18,

to

accept

1985,

(Exhibit

Humphries

10, 1985, which

69, Addendum

had

received

a

C) .

By

written

appraisal confirming the value of the property to be as low
as $35,000, and therefore on that date, Humphries had his
attorney send Wright another letter in an attempt to resolve
the

matter

short

of

litigation.

The

letter

included

a

proposed agreement to rescind the transaction
Addendum D) .

Wright rejected

(Exhibit 75,

any attempt to resolve the

matter and filed suit shortly thereafter.

CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES POST-SALE AND DURING
INITIAL LITIGATION
After the sale of the nursery, Wright and Humphries, by
mutual

agreement,

continued

to

use

the

same

checking

account, but Wriqht did not add his name as a signator,
leaving the management decisions and payment of bills up to
Humphries
on

(T.7 21). Until the incident at the public library

December

5,

1985,

the

parties

were

on

an

extremely

friendly basis, which even continued for a period of time
thereafter until Humphries sought the aid of counsel.
Even

though Wright

obtained

a Temporary

Restraining

Order in December of 1985, he did not seek to have Humphries
removed as the manager until March of 1986.
The best months for a nursery in St. George are March,
April and May, with a slow down for the next few months, and
a moderate resurgence in September, October and November.
Because spring comes much earlier in Utah's Dixie than the
rest of the state, a nursery

in that area starts buying

plants, seeds and related products and begins planting in
the greenhouses as early as November or December of each
year.

This naturally creates a demand for money to pay for

products purchased, but v/ithout a resulting cash flow until
the high sales volume occurs in March.
Prior to the sale, Humphries had obtained a line of
credit with Zions First National Bank in St. George, and had
initially obtained a $15,000 loan, the repayment of which is
addressed in the Purchase Agreement.
Being

somewhat naive

in business matters, Humphries

continued to use his line of credit to borrow additional
funds for the nursery even though he had sold the nursery to
Wright.

Because of the pressing

financial needs of the

nursery and an overdraft checking account, Humphries signed
a second promissory note for $30,000 in favor of Zions on
December

10, 1985

(Exhibit

20, T.797, 991).

Humphries

actually made arrangements to obtain the funds prior to
December 5, 1985 (T.143).
the note on December

Humphries drew $15,000 against

13, 1985, an additional $5,000 on

December 30, 1985, and a final $10,000 on January 6, 1986.
All draws were deposited, in full, into the Westside Nursery
account (T.991).
Wright testified that his agreement with Humphries was
that if money had to be borrowed on the Zions account, he
would co-sign the note so the money would be repaid, but he
had to approve the loan in advance, and it had to be for
nursery business (Summary of Wright's testimony by the trial
court,

T.526).

Wright

initially

testified

that

after

October

4,

Humphries

1985,
to

(T.527).

he

go

to

never

considered

3 ions

and

or

borrow

asked

Darrel

additional

funds

However, Wright's testimony was clearly impeached

on that issue (T.527-31) .
given his handwritten

On cross- examination Wright was

notes which he identified

as being

written prior to November 11, 1985, notes he did not know
Humphries had in his possession.
to do

for

$" we

find

Under the heading "Things

in Wright's

personal

handwriting:

"Have Darrell

(sic) get Loan to cover new materiels

(Exhibit

p.2,

67

Addendum

H) .

Wright

(sic)"

conceded

on

cross-examination that the $30,000 loan was used to purchase
plant and other materials (T.1030), having earlier signed an
affidavit to that effect on February 15, 1986,
The jury found that Wright should pay the $30,000 note
and Humphries was awarded judgment by the trial court in the
sum

of

$37,305.21, which was

the principal

plus

accrued

interest as per the terms of the note as of the date of
trial (R.245; Addendum I, p.6, 1.14).
remains

personally

judgment

against

liable
Wright

offsets in Wright's favor.
the

court

against

erred

Wright

in
for

not

on
for

the
the

Of course, Humphries

note

and

amount

has

only

specified

a

less

It is Humphries1 position that
awarding

interest

a

Humphries

continuing
will

have

judgment
to

pay

according to the terms of said note, plus attorney's fees
Humphries will also have to pay if Zions forecloses.
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The

basis

of

this

argument

is that Wright

testified

that if

money was needed to be borrowed at Zions, he would sign a
note due the same date as the money was to be repaid.
court

so

summarized

Wright's

testimony,

but

The

thereafter

denied Humphries1 request to completely indemnify Humphries
consistent with the terms of the promissory note Humphries
signed and for which he will ultimately be responsible.
From October

4, 1985 through March

19, 1986, Wright

only deposited enough money in the nursery account to pay
two

months

rentf

or

approximately

$6 f 000 f

leaving

the

business to operate on borrowed money or existing cash flow
(T.122-23).

He did this in spite of a substantial increase

in inventory and the "gearing up" for the spring and summer
months.
business
Agreement

Humphries had to borrow money in order to keep the
operational

and

to

perform

required.

The

efforts

as

made

his
by

Management

Humphries

on

Wright's behalf from October 4, 1985 through March 19, 1986
are depicted in the photographs taken at the time Humphries
was removed as manager and possession of the nursery given
to Wright (Exhibit 47 f photograph binder).
apparent

to

the

jury

that

Wright

At trial it was

intentionally

left

Humphries in as manager until late March so that he could
utilize his expertise in the field and have the nursery in
top shape for the spring season, with full knowledge that
Humphries could not compete with Wright because of the non-

competition
Agreement
found

clause

earlier

that

Wright

in

favor

of Wright

in the

Management

enforced by the trial court.
breached

the

Management

The

Agreement

jury
and

awarded Humphries six months pay at the rate of $2,500 per
month for a total of $15,000.

Humphries testified that he

was not able to find gainful employment for six months after
he was removed as manager (T.812-13).
The

jury

also

found

that

Humphries

breached

the

parties1 agreements and awarded Wright damages in the amount
of $6,805, basically reimbursing Wright for monies spent by
Humphries for Humphries1 personal benefit while he was the
manager

(R.242).

The court also ordered Humphries to pay

Wright for all accounts payable in excess of $5,000 owed as
of October 4, 1985, or the sum of $6,772.

Humphries never

denied he didn't owe accounts payable in excess of $5,000
(R.245).

The court, post-trial, awarded Wright pre-judgment

interest on $13,577, but refused

to award Humphries

pre-

judgment interest on $20,198.21 Wright was ordered to pay
after offsets, and likewise refused to grant pre-judgment
interest on damages awarded by reason of the fraud committed
by Wright

(R.245-46).

Specifically, the court refused to

grant pre-judgment interest to Humphries on the $38,582 from
and

after

October

4,

1985

until

the

time

of

judgment

(R.246).

Of course, no pre-judgment interest was awarded

Humphries

on the $15,000 originally
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awarded by the jury,

because

the

post-trial.

court

took

that award

away

from Humphries,

Humphries contends that it was error for the

court to award pre-judgment interest to Wright for damages
in his favor but to deny Humphries pre-judgment interest on
the amounts awarded to him.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

jury

properly

concluded

and

properly sustained the jury verdict that

the

trial

court

(1) Wright mis-

represented the value of the property conveyed to Humphries
and (2) that Wright should pay Humphries for the $30,0 00
note borrowed by Humphries and deposited to the Westside
Nursery account and spent on nursery debts.

Wright has

failed to establish, as appellate review requires, that the
facts most favorable to the trial court judgment are insufficient to support that judgment.
The evidence not only establishes misrepresentations
concerning value that substantiate a finding of fraud, but
supports a finding that Wright made statements concerning
the value of the Ogden property recklessly or with knowledge
that said statements were false.

Furthermore, the failure

to disclose vital information concerning value or restrictions on the development potential of the property negates
Wright's claim that an opinion concerning value stated in
good faith is not actionable as fraud.

The trial court should not have taken away the jury
verdict

in

Wright1s

favor

of

breach

Humphries

of

Wright's defense of

the

for

?15,000

Management

arising

Agreement,

justification, when

from

despite

in fact the jury

found, and the trial court sustained a finding, that Wright
breached

both

the

Purchase

Agreement

and

the

Management

Agreement, particularly since Wright did not object to the
form cf the Special Verdict before it was filed.
Finally,

the

trial

court

erroneously

awarded

Wright

pre-judgment interest on damages running in his favor while
at the same time, denied pre-judgment interest for damages
running in favor of Humphries.
As a result of the foregoing, this Court should affirm
the

finding

of

fraud

and

indemnification

in

favor

of

Humphries, reverse the trial court and reinstate the $15,000
awarded Humphries
grant

pre-judgment

affirm Humphries1

for breach of the Management Agreement,
interest

in

favor

award of attorney's

of

both

parties,

fees in the sum of

$10,000, and grant Humphries further indemnification on the
$30,000 promissory note according to the terms thereof,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WRIGHT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FACTS
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT JUDGMENT
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Because Wright's appeal is based, for the most part, on
claims of

insufficiency

of the evidence, this Court must

uphold the judgment of the trial court unless Wright is able
to

demonstrate

that

the

facts

most

favorable

to

that

judgment are insufficient to support it.
In Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986), the
Supreme Court stated:
Under familiar rules of appellate review, the
Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court, and
the findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless there is no substantial record
evidence to support them.
It is incumbent upon
the appellant to marshal all of the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and to then
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the factual determinations made
by
the
trial
court, that
the evidence
is
insufficient to support its findings.
728 P.2d at 982.
In

at

least

four

cases,

the

appellate

courts

have

declined to consider an attack based on the insufficiency of
the

evidence

where

the

appellant

failed,

as

Wright

has

failed, to first marshal the facts in support of the trial
court's findings.

See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d

1068

(Utah 1985); J&M Const. Co. v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah
1986); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d

301

(Utah App.

1987); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).
The standard

is equally applicable to jury verdicts.

In Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d

619

(Utah 1976), the jury, on

special interrogatories, returned a verdict for defendant,

and plaintiff appealed citing evidence favorable to her own
point of view.

The Supreme Court, at page 620, stated that

plaintiff's argument was "based on the fallacy so prevalent
in cases of this kind; that of basing a hypothesis on a view
of the evidence favorable to one's own purpose and desires.
This invades the province of the jury, whose prerogative it
was to decide what evidence to believe."

The jury verdict

was affirmed.
The

general

rule

was

irore

recently

articulated

in

Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co. y 701 P.2d 1078, 1082
(Utah

1985) , the

Court

stating,

"Where

evidence

is

in

conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury believed
those

facts that

support

its verdict, and we

review

the

facts and reasonable inferences that arise from those facts
in a light most supportive of the jury's verdict."
Despite Wright's contention to the contrary, appellate
courts do not review findings of fraud by the "clear and
convincing" standard.
(Idaho

1980) , the

defendant.
plaintiff

Prior
with

In Faw v. Greenwood, 613 P. 2d 1338

plaintiff
to

the

sale,

and

loss

profit

examined the business books.
defendant had defrauded
counterclaimed

for

bought

him

breach

of

the

a business
defendant

statements

and

from

the

presented
plaintiff

Plaintiff later alleged that
and brought
contract.

suit.
The

Defendant

trial

court

ruled in favor of defendant on both plaintiff's complaint
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and defendant's counterclaim, and plaintiff appealed.

The

Idaho Supreme Court, at page 1340, stated, "The issue as to
whether

fraud

has

been

proven

by

clear

and

convincing

evidence is for the determination of the trier of fact.
appeal

that

supported
evidence."

determination

by

competent,

Our

Supreme

will

not

substantial
Court

also

be

reversed

though
has

On

where

conflicting

recognized

the

"substantial and competent" test as the proper standard for
reviewing findings of fraud.

See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705

P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) at page 769.

See also Stauth v. Brown,

734 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) .

POINT II
HUMPHRIES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
A.
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD
For purposes of consistency, Humphries will address the
elements of fraud in the same order as identified by Wright.
The

jury

was

instructed

consistent

with

Pace

v«

Parrish, 122 Utah 144, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), concerning the
nine elements necessary to find fraud.

They are as follows:

(1) That a representation was made;
(2)
concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation;

(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other party acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)
did in fact relv upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
247 P.2d at 274-75.
Before
Court's

attention

acknowledge
elements

discussing

or

is

these

respective

directed

address

the

to

Wright's

material

(2) , (3) , (4) (a) (b) and

elements,

facts

the

failure

to

concerning

(5) above, discussed

on

pages 8-11 of this brief.

B.
STATEMENTS REGARDING VALUE AS AN ELEMENT OF FRAUD
Wright

cites

what

he

claims

to

be

the

case

most

directly on point, to-wit, Baird v. Eflow Inv. Co., 76 Utah
232 f 289 P. 112 (1930).

Not only is the case distinguish-

able on its facts, but the general rule is not quoted in its
entirety in appellant's brief.

The court stated:

It is the general rule that misrepresentations as
to value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as
they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion
or "trader's talk" involving matter of judgment
and estimation as to which men may differ. [Citations omitted].
For such representions to be
actionable they must be coupled with concealment
of material facts or with artifice or misrepresentation used to prevent the hearer from learning
the truth, or be made under such circumstances as
to indicate that the hearer will rely on them, as
when the truth of the speaker's statement is a
controlling element of the transaction, or because
confidential relations exist.
289 P. at 114.
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Baird is further distinguishable in that the owner of
the ranch in Montana employed defendants as brokers to find
a purchaser for it and ultimately the brokers acted for both
parties.

Also,

the

available to him.

buyer

had

substantial

information

The court stated:

The plaintiff knew that the brokers were acting
for both sides to the trade. He, with his wife,
made a trip to Salt Lake City from Montana for the
purpose and did inspect the apartments.
He
consulted a banker in Montana, who he said was his
business adviser, concerning the trade before he
made it. He also consulted a lawyer of his own
selection in Salt Lake City concerning the legal
phases of the matter.
He inquired repeatedly
about the details of the income and expenses of
the apartments, and was furnished a true statement
thereof before he completed his contract. There
was nothing done by defendants to prevent the
plaintiff from making the fullest inquiry and
investigation
concerning
the
value
of
the
apartments.
289 P. at 114.
There

is a great difference between a representation

made as statement of opinion and a representation made as
statement of fact.

As stated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and

Deceit § 112 (1968):
Whether a misrepresentation as to value is merely
an expression of opinion, or an affirmation of
fact or intentional misrepresentation to be relied
upon, is generally regarded as a question of fact
to be determined by the trier of facts.
As further clarified in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit
§ 115 (1968) :
There are many exceptions to the general rule that
statements of value are not a sufficient basis for

a charge of fraud, such exceptions arising out of
the special circumstances under which the representations are made. It cannot be laid down as a
matter of law that value is never a material fact.
For example, the general rule that such statements
are not actionable applies only where the parties
stand on an equal footing and have equal means of
knowledge, with no relation of trust or confidence
existing between them. Likewise, a statement of
value may be of such a character, so made and
intended, and so received, as to constitute
fundamental misrepresentation; and if it is made
as an assertion of fact, and with the purpose that
it shall be so received, and it is so received, it
may amount to a fraud. Moreover, a statement of
value involving and coupled with a statement of a
material fact is fraud.
After

the contract was

signed

and while the parties

were enroute to the subject property, Wright made representations to Humphries that the surrounding property consistently sold for $30,000 per acre
subject property
per

lot

(as

(T.588-90), and that the

in a developed state would bring $30,000

compared

to

$30,000

per

acre)

(T.590).

Approximately two years after the transaction, the subject
property sold for only $18,233 per acre.
The following statement from 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit

§

118

(1968) , entitled

"Market

value

or

market

price", has direct application:
While different conclusions have been reached
under varying fact situations, most of the courts
support the proposition that representations of
market price or market value are not necessarily
mere representations of opinion, but are, or at
least under some circumstances may be, representations of fact on which fraud may be predicated.
For instance, a representation that a certain kind
of property, constantly sold, has a market at
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certain figures and that it readily sells at those
figures, has been held to be not a statement of
opinion, but one of factr upon which fraud may be
predicated. Emphasis added.
As stated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 119
(1968) , other exceptions exist to the general rule that an
opinion concerning value is not actionable:
This is particularly true where the vendor or
seller holds a position of trust and confidence
toward the vendee which gives the latter the right
to rely on the representationf or where the vendor
or seller assumes tc have special knowledge of the
value , and the vendee , to the former's knowledge,
trusts entirely to the vendor's representations.
In such cases the vendor or seller may justly be
held liable for his false representations, because
by them the purchaser is fraudulently induced to
forbear inquiry as to their truth. This principle
is especially applicable where land was situated
at a great distance and the vendor knew that the
purchaser was not conversant with the general
value of the land in the locality and relied on
his representations in respect thereto. Citations
omitted.
Wright also cites the case of Poison Co. v. Imperial
Cattle Co. , 624 P.2d 993 (Mont. 1981), regarding opinion
statements as elements of fraud, but that case can likewise
be distinguished.

The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the

trier of fact and stated:
We emphasize, however, that it is singularly
within the province of the District Court to
determine whether fraud has been perpetrated on
an innocent purchaser. The District Court is in
the best position to weigh the factors involved,
assess the credibility of witnesses, and
conclude whether the statements regarding value
constitute fact or opinion.
624 P.2d at 996.

The

Poison

court

determines

that

it

must

view

the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party
and

presume

judgment.
trier of
value

the

correctness

of

the

District

Court's

The court clearly states that it is up to the
fact

were

to determine

opinion

(not

if the representations
actionable) ,

as

as to

compared

to

declarations of fact (actionable), and concludes that it is
not the proper function of the Supreme Court to exchange its
opinion for that of the trier of fact, even if a different
conclusion might have been reached.
Wright cites the Arizona case of Frazier v. Southwest
Sav.

& Loan Ass'n., 653 P.2d

support of his

position

that

362

(Ariz. App.

fraud was

not

1982) , in

established.

Frazier deals with both fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

One of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations was

that the subdivision was "ready to go".
that no

fraud

existed

because

The court concluded

there was

no

evidence

of

Southwest1s knowledge that the "ready to go" statements were
made nor that Southwest knew that those representations were
false.

In the instant case, howeverf Wright admitted that

he did not know the value of the property at the time the
representations

were

made

(i.e.,

reckless

misrepresenta-

tion) , and that even though he knew of the potential for a
building
Humphries

moratorium,
(i.e.,

he

did

not

concealment).

disclose
In

0-7

the

Frazier,

same

the

to

court

further described the relationship between the court and the
jury in determining whether a duty to speak exists, citing
with

approval

the

following

statement

from

Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 551, Comment m (1977):
Whether there is a duty to the other to disclose
the fact in question is always a matter for the
determination of the court.
If there are
disputed facts bearing upon the existence of the
duty, as for example the defendant's knowledge
of the fact, the other's ignorance of it or his
opportunity to ascertain itf the customs of the
particular trade, or the defendant's knowledge
that the plaintiff reasonably expects him to
make the disclosure, they are to be determined
by the jury under appropriate instructions as to
the existence of the duty.
653 P.2d at 368.
Finally, Frazier

is distinguishable in that Southwest

had appraised the property because by law it could only loan
7 5% of the appraised value.

In the instant case, Wright did

not have the property appraised and did not know the value
of the property at the time he made factual representations
as to its value which he admitted he intended Defendants to
rely upon, and upon which Defendants did in fact rely in
determining whether or not to consummate transaction.

C.
CONCEALMENT AS FRAUD
Contrary to Wright's position, the building moratorium
declared by the Weber County Commission eleven days after

the transaction was consummated had significant impact en
the

value

of

the

property.

The

appraiser

called

by

Humphries, Les Froerer, testified as follows:
Q. FRY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Did you
moratorium in determining value?

rely

on

that

A. [BY MR. FROERER] I relied on that moratorium in
attempting to get the highest and best use. But
yes, it — indirectly, yes.
Q. And just tell us why that moratorium would aid
you in determining highest and best use.
A. Either you can build homes on it, or you can't
build homes on it.
And the difference between
being able to or not able to drastically affects
value — changes the use.
If it had to go back into agricultural usef you're
going down to a much —
to a nominal value.
(T.920) .
In Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d

802

(Utah

facts somewhat parallel the instant case.
evidence

showed

that

the

seller

knew

that

1963) , the

In Elder, the
a

quarantine

existed on the farm premises to be sold, that the existence
thereof could materially affect the economic operation of
the farmf
buyer.

and that he failed to disclose the same to the
The

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

lower

court's

dismissal of plaintiff's suit to rescind and remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed
in the opinion.
occasion

to

make

The
an

court noted

that the buyer

independent

quarantine of which he knew nothing.

2Q

investigation

had
of

no
the

In the instant case,

Wright

knew

that

a

building

moratorium

was

imminently

likely, and that the moratorium was not of public record.
Humphries, acting reasonably, could not have discovered the
facts

necessary

investigation.

to

require

him

to

make

an

independent

The court concluded in Elder that there was

a suppression of the truth, which the party with superior
knowledge had a duty to disclose, and that the same amounted
to fraud.

The Supreme Court

in support of its decision,

citing American Jurisprudence, stated:
One of the fundamental tenets of the AngloAmerican law of fraud is that fraud may be
committed by the suppression of the truth * * *
as well as the suggestion of falsehood * * * *.
Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must
relate to a material matter known to the party and
which it is his legal duty to communicate to the
other contracting party, whether the duty arises
from a relation of trust, from confidence,
inequality of condition and knowledge, or other
attendant circumstances * * * .
The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it
relates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is
maintainable where a party who knows material
facts is under a duty, under the circumstances, to
speak and disclose his information, but remains
silent * *.
Although the pertinent inquiry in any case where
fraud on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is
whether, upon any particular occasion, it was the
duty of the person to speak on pain of being
guilty of a fraud by reason of his silence, except
in broad terms the law does not attempt to define
the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the
contrary, there has been adopted, as a leading
principle, the proposition that whether a duty to
speak exists is determinable by reference to all
the circumstances of the case and by comparing the

facts not disclosed with the object and end in
view by the contracting parties. The difficulty
is not so much in stating the general principles
of lawf which are pretty well understood, as in
applying the law to particular groups of facts * *
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as
to certain facts is a factor in determining that a
duty of disclosure is owing.
There is much
authority to the effect that if one party to a
contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or
knowledge which is not within the fair and
reasonable reach of the other party and which he
could not discover by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or means of knowledge which are not
open to both parties alike, he is under a legal
obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes
fraud, especially when the other party relies upon
him to communicate to him the true state of facts
to enable him to judge of the expediency of the
bargain.
384 P.2d at 804-05.

Emphasis added.

D.
KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY OR REPRESENTATIONS
MADE RECKLESSLY AS AN ELEMENT OF FRAUD
Wright claims "good faith" because of an opinion letter
(Exhibit 32) stating that 5.39 acres located on the south
end of the same 22 acre tract had a value of $32,500 per
acre.

The letter is dated May 8, 1985 and directed to Ed

Suppington, St. George, Utah, not Wright.

There is nothing

in the record to indicate when Wright obtained a copy of the
letter

or

knew

of

its

contents

prior

to

the

sale

to

Humphries, save and except that the bank to which the letter

-*i

was directed loaned Wright money based on the land having a
value of $20f000 per acre, not $32f500 per acre.
evidence
letter

at

trial was

that Wright

after Humphries became

showed

concerned

The only

Humphries

this

that he had been

defrauded (T.596-600).
The fact that Wright did not have an opinion for the
value of the property at the time of the transaction and
thereafter made reckless representations concerning value is
supported by the record.

At trial, Wright was asked if he

had previously testified that he did not have an opinion as
to the value of the three acres he deeded to Humphries as of
the date of the transfer.
previous

testimony.

deposition

Wright denied having given that

He was

taken on February

then asked

to

20, 1986, and

read
the

from

following

exchange appears in the trial transcript:
Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN]
Did I ask you the
question:
"You've been involved in the real
estate business since 1957, at least; is that
correct?"
A. [BY MR. WRIGHT]

Yes.

Q. Your answer was "yes." "Q. On October 4, 1985,
did you have an opinion as to the value of the
three acres you deeded to Mr. and Mrs. Humphries?"
What was your answer?
A. "No."
Q. "Q. You couldn't form an opinion as to value?"
What was your Answer?
A.

"No."

his

Q. Then did I ask you: "Who do you believe would
be a qualified person to form an opinion as to the
value of that property?" What was your answer?
A. "The buyer who mav buv it.
may buy it." (T.1032-1033).
In

spite

concerning
October

of

the

4,

the

value

1985,

fact
of

the

that

the

You know, whomever
Wright

three

testimony

had

acres
from

of

both

no

opinion

property

on

Wright

and

Humphries was that Wright consistently told Humphries the
property was worth at least $90,000.
In

Jardine

v.

Brunswick

Corp.,

423

P.2d

659

(Utah

1967) , the court recognized the principle that under some
circumstances there may be a cause of action for fraud for a
reckless or negligent misrepresentation:
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a
transaction, is in a superior position to know
material facts, and carelessly or negligently
makes a false representation concerning them,
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon,
and the other party reasonably does so and suffers
loss in that transaction, the representor can be
held responsible if the other elements of fraud
are also present.
423 P.2d at 662.
The

footnote

to

the

language

just

cited

further

clarifies the court's position:
This is a variant of one of the traditionally accepted
elements of fraud as set forth in Pace v. Parrish, 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, Element No. (4), that the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) makes
recklessly, knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such a representation; see also Stuck v.
Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P.791.
423 P.2d at 662.

Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978), affirms
the

fact

that

reckless

conduct

can

be

actionable.

In

Schwartz , Justice Gordon Hall writing the unanimous opinion,
affirmed the trial court's finding of fraud, and stated:
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise and are resorted to in order to gain
advantage over another. In its general or generic
sense, it comprises all acts, omissions and
concealments involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty and resulting damage to another.
•

*

*

*

The elements of actionable fraud to be proved are
a false representation of an existing material
fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose
of inducing reliance thereon, upon which plaintiff
reasonably relies to his detriment. (Citing Pace
v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952)). Emphasis
added.
576 P.2d at 875.
Wright claims that the failure to disclose the building
moratorium or elevated coliform levels was not a material
omission on his part and was not a serious factor in
determining the value of the subject property.

The jury and

the trial court both heard this same argument and chose to
reject it.
In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1980) , the court made note of the fact that the
potential buyer could have discovered by inquiry into the
public records that Defendant owned no interest in the
subject property.

The evidence in the instant case is that

a preliminary title report was presented to Humphries at
closing, which failed to indicate a building moratorium, or
the potential for one.

In Sugarhouse Finance, the court

recognized that misrepresentation may be made either by
affirmative statement or by material omission where there
exists a duty to speak, but that such a duty will not be
found where the parties deal at arms length, and where the
underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both
parties.

Clearly, in the instant case, the potential for a

building moratorium and other problems with the property
were not within the knowledge of both Wright and Humphries,
and therefore Wright had an obligation to disclose the same.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THE OBLIGATION OF
WRIGHT TO INDEMNIFY HUMPHRIES ON THE $30,0 00 NOTE
After the Purchase Agreement and Management Agreement
were signed, Wright opted to continue to use the existing
Westside Nursery checking account and did not even request
that he become a signatory on the account

(T.726).

Like-

wise, Wright asked Humphries not to tell anyone that the
nursery had been sold because Wright had not established a
credit rating in the St. George area and particularly with
Zions Bank (T.721, 724). In late October, Wright, Humphries
and their wives, drove to the west coast in Wright's motor
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home to buy new materials (T.722).

Humphries estimates that

they spent somewhere between $15f000 and $20f0 00 in buying
new materials for the nursery (T.723).

Humphries testified

that he had a discussion with Ron Wright that there was not
sufficient money in the checking account to cover checks in
that amount, and because it would put the checking account
in an overdraft position, Wright gave Humphries directions
to borrow an additional $30,000 from Zions Bank (T.723; also
Exhibit 67 , Addendum H) . Because Humphries had established
a good relationship with Zions, he obtained the $30,000,
using his line of credit, the implication being that Wright
did not want to sign any promissory note if he wasn't forced
to do so. Of significance is the fact that Section 1 of the
Contract

for

Management

Services

(Addendum

B)

requires

Humphries to "perform pursuant to the orders, advice and
direction of owner".
Humphries
promissory

made

arrangements

note on December

for

and

signed

the

10, 1985, approximately

weeks before he was served with any restraining order.

two
Only

as demands on the checking account required funds, did he
draw against that line of credit (Exhibits 70 through 74,
consisting of bank statements and check stubs for 1985 and
1986) .
Wright claims Humphries should be denied indemnification for three reasons cited on page 43 of his brief.

Those

same arguments were made to the court, in his JNOV motion,
and were rejected based on a review of the evidence and the
jury

verdict.

Humphries

The

was

only

jury

could

following

have

easily

believed

that

he had

been

the directions

given by Wright, and clearly, there was a need to cover the
purchase of new plant materials due to the various buying
trips.

Furthermore, when Wright had Humphries served with a

Temporary Restraining Order, he did not elect to terminate
his employment as the manager cf Westside Nursery, and the
jury

could

affirmation

have

easily

determined

that Humphries

funds were in fact needed.

was doing

that

this

a good

was

an

job and

the

Finally, all of the funds were

deposited into the bank account of Westside Nursery and used
to pay bills and other obligations.
found

Humphries

to have wrongly
obligated

the

In other words, Wright, not Humphries, benefited

from

$30,000

the

Wright

account,

amounts.

and

repay

from

is

borrowed,

to

spent

Humphries

the

now

For the money the jury

jury

those

concluded

exact

that

because Humphries was instructed to borrow the money, and
because

Wright

received

the

benefit

of

the

money,

that

Wright should pay the obligation.
This issue was a factual issue to be decided by the
jury and the jury decision
disturbed.

in that regard

The jury, in essence, completed

should not be
an accounting

and found that Humphries paid over to his employer all money
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or other property he had received

as manager, save and

except the sum of $6,805 that Humphries v/as ordered to pay
to Wright.

POINT IV
HUMPHRIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
Contrary to Wright's position, Humphries succeeded in
the

enforceability

obtaining
could

of

the

contracts.

He

succeeded

in

a judgment of indemnification, which the jury

have

found

he

was

entitled

to

under

either

Purchase Agreement or the Management Agreement.

the

Likewise,

he prevailed in that the jury found that Wright breached the
Purchase Agreement by not transferring property having a
value of $90,000 to Humphries.

Furthermore, the evidence is

unrebutted

provided

that Wright

never

Humphries

with a

policy of title insurance insuring the value of the subject
property
closing.

for $90,000 and did not convey clear title at
Finally,

the

jury

awarded

Humphries

$15,000

damages because Wright breached the Management Agreement,
which should be reinstated by this court and would thus
entitle Humphries to attorney's fees.
Through trial Humphries incurred in excess of $30,000
in

attorney's

fees

(T.1039-43, Exhibit

84).

The

jury

awarded less than one-third of attorney's fees incurred,
requiring Humphries to absorb the difference.

This Court

should affirm the lower award of fees and award Humphries
additional attorney's fees incurred in this appeal pursuant
to the language of the Purchase Agreement.

POINT V
THE INJUNCTION BOND SHOULD NOT BE EXONERATED
The court required Wright to post a bond when it gave
possession of the nursery to him and issued a pre-judgment
writ
timef

of

attachment

against Humphries1

property.

At that

Humphries could not compete with Wright due to the

non-competition

clause.

If

this

court

reinstates

the

judgment in the sum of $15f000 for breach of the Management
Contract, then the injunctive bond serves to guarantee that
Humphries will be paid because he was wrongfully enjoined
after March 1986.
Had Humphries been entitled to remain as manager of the
nursery, and in control of the checking account as per the
original agreement of the parties, he could have repaid the
monies borrowed
business.

from

Because

Zions Bank

he was

in the normal course of

restrained

from doing

so, and

because the court ordered Wright to indemnify Humphries on
the note, the Injunction Bond

should remain in effect to

also protect Humphries on that claim.
Wright posted a $75,000 cash supersedeas bond for this
appeal.

Within

three

months

thereafter,

he

filed

for

protection under Chapter
bankruptcy

attorney,

11 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Gerald

H.

Suniville,

has

His

advised

Humphries1 counsel that he may challenge the posting of the
supersedeas
challenge

bond

as

a

preferential

transfer.

If

that

is successful, Humphries will be left to seek

collection of his judgment against a bankrupt individual.
The better approach is to leave the Injunction Bond in
place, and if the judgment is affirmed on appeal, allow the
issue of the surety's liability to Humphries to be litigated
in the district court.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED,
POST-TRIAL, THE JURY AWARD ARISING FROM THE BREACH
OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT BY WRIGHT
In support of Wright's JNOV Motion, Wright claimed that
the

special

interrogatories

somehow defective.

submitted

to

the

jury were

Wright did not submit a Special Verdict

as did Humphries, did not

raise objection as to the form of

the Special Verdict used by the Court, and did not object to
the filing of the verdict before the jury was dismissed (T.
1141, 1146).
In Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643 (Utah 1966),
the

court,

at

page

644,

stated,

"The

trial

judge's

prerogative to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
can properly be exercised only in a situation where there is

no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the verdict
of the jury."

In the Schow case, plaintiffs had sued to

have certain agreements declared void for fraud.

On special

interrogatories, the jury found for plaintiff.

However the

judge granted a JNOV Motion and plaintiffs appealed.

The

appellate court considered a "survey" of the evidence which
revealed

several

facts

which

could

have

supported

plaintiff's contention of fraud, and consequently remanded
the case to the trial court for judgment in accordance with
the jury verdict.
In order for the trial court's JNOV on Wright's breach
of the Management Agreement to stand, the trial court had to
find as a matter of fact (not law) that no evidence existed
to

support

the

jury's

verdict

argument of justification.

which

rejected

Wright's

What the trial court failed to

recognize is that the special interrogatory asks whether or
not Humphries breached the agreements^
readily

concluded

Agreement,

as

that

compared

Humphries
to

the

The jury could have

breached

Management

the

Purchase

Agreement,

and

since Plaintiff failed to request a separate interrogatory
concerning the breach of the Purchase Agreement versus the
Management Agreement, it was error
away

the

jury

verdict

awarding

for the court to take
Humphries

$15,000

for

Wright's breach of the Management Agreement.
Furthermore, the fact that Wright was awarded damages
by the jury for the breach by Humphries under one of the
41

agreements
breach

indicates

and

rejected

awarded
Wright's

that the
damages
claim

jury took

based
of

upon

into account the
the

evidence, but

justification

in

firing

Humphries.
The jury specifically
Management
$15,000.

Agreement

and

found that Wright breached
awarded

damages

in

the

sum

the
of

However, the jury also found that Wright breached

the agreements^ in other respects, but awarded no damages.
In other words, the
parties breached

jury apparently

determined

that both

one agreement or the other, and

damages based upon the proof submitted.

awarded

For the trial court

to take away $15,000 on the theory of justification simply
because

the

jury

found

Humphries

breached

the

agreement^

(without a specific finding as to which agreement) and is
thus barred from recovering under the Management Agreement
is simply not supported by the evidence nor applicable law.
Humphries maintains that the Special Verdict was clear,
concise and unambiguous.

However, if this Court should find

otherwise, the Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah
1985) , has stated the rule and the duty imposed upon the
parties and in this case on Wright:
When special interrogatories or verdicts are
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to
object to the filing of the verdict or to move
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for
clarification.
If
a
party
fails
to
take

appropriate action before the discharge of the
verdict, that party generally may not later move
for a new trial en the ground that the verdict was
defective.
701 P.2d at 1083.
The court further states that only when the verdict is
so ambiguous, contradictory or illogical that it does not
clearly indicate for whom the verdict is rendered, should
the

trial

awarded

court

intervene.

attorney's

fees

The

and

fact

Wright

was

the

Humphries

notf

is

a clear

indication that Humphries, and not Wright, prevailed.
Bennion

opinion

also

explains

that

the

rule

was

The

requiring a

timely objection serves to avoid the expense and additional
time for a new trial in having the jury which heard the
facts clarify the ambiguity while it is still able to do so.
In the instant case, a reading of the Special Verdict
does

not place

alternative

but

the

Court

in

the

to

guess

at

what

suggested by Wright.

position
the

jury

of

having

no

intended

as

Wright would have the Court adopt a

holding to the effect that simply because the jury found
that Humphries breached one of the agreements, he is not
entitled to recover under the Management Contract.
found

that

Wright

awarded damages.

breached

the

Management

The jury

Contract

and

The Special Verdict could not have been

clearer. Plaintiff's

failure to submit a Special Verdict,

and his subsequent failure to object to the filing of the

A**

verdict or to move that the matter be resubmitted to the
jury before discharge constitutes a waiver on the part of
Plaintiff,

thus

directing

the

trial

court

to

adopt

the

findings of the jury.
Wright

further

argued

to

the

trial

court

that

"justification" for termination was not decided by the jury.
Quite the contrary is true.
Special

Interrogatory

terminated

Humphries

The jury specifically found in

No.

3

that

as an employee

Agreement.

If he was

justified,

wrongful.

By

finding

terminated,

the

jury

that

concluded

Wright
under

it would

Humphries
that

the

Humphries

the

reasons

outlined

in

stated

by

Wright's

Management

not have
was

Wright

for

hand-written

been

wrongfully

justification

part of Wright to do so did not exist, and
rejected

wrongfully

on

the

specifically
terminating
letter

to

Humphries dated March 19, 1986 (Exhibit 29 f Addendum J ) .

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOW IT CALCULATED
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
In L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., 608 P.2d
626 (Utah 1980) , the court stated:
Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded
as damages due to the opposing party's delay in
tendering the amount owing under an obligation.
608 P.2d at 629.

In Bjork v. April Indust. , Inc., 560 P.2d

315

(Utah

1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[T]he law in Utah is clear, viz: Where the damage
is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as
of a particular timef and that loss can be
measured by facts and figures, interest should be
allowed from that time and not from the date of
the judgment.
560 P.2d at 317.
In

this

case,

Humphries

was

entitled

to

receive

property having a value of $90,000 on October 4, 1985, a
date

certain.

His

damages

arose

from

a

contract,

as

compared to a personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, or

false

imprisonment

(see Bjork, supra).

He

should therefore receive pre-judgment interest from October
4, 1985 to date of judgment on $38 f 582.
Humphries1

entitlement to interest on damages awarded

him by reason of indemnification on the $30f000 promissory
note, is discussed above.
Humphries

all

amounts

Wright should be obligated to pay

Humphries

incurs

arising

from

the

$30f000 promissory note, including interest as set forth in
the

note,

together

with

any

costs

Humphries may be required to pay.

or

attorney's

fees

To hold otherwise would

award Humphries damages only through date of trial, plus the
judgment rate of interest (12%) , and allow Wright to escape
liability for the promissory note rate of interest

(prime

plus three percent) as well as any attorney's fees and costs

4R

Humphries will incur because he has not been able to pay the
note that is due on demand.

POINT VIII
COUNSEL'S REPLY TO ETHICAL ISSUE
Wright's

counsel's

statement

concerning

the

under-

signed's alleged ethical violation on page 39 of Appellant's
Brief mandates a reply, even though Mr. Pendleton fails to
recognize the appropriate forum to raise an ethical issue.
The undersigned hesitates to utilize this brief to respond
and the space taken could be better used to address issues
at

hand.

However,

failing

to

respond

may

be

deemed

acquiescence and therefore the court needs to understand the
correct facts.
1.

After Humphries' brief in opposition to Wright's

Motion for Judgment NOV was filed, Mr. Pendleton could have
filed a motion to strike improper argument before submitting
the same for decision to the trial court.
2.

He did nothing.

To claim that Wright testified consistent with the

depositions

of

Graham

Shirra

and Richard

Schwartz

is

to

state facts that are not of record and therefore improper,
because neither Shirra nor Schwartz testified at trial, nor
were their depositions used.

In fact, Wright's testimony is

not totally consistent with their depositions.
3.

If Mr. Pendleton thought the testimony of Shirra

and Schwrartz to be consistent with that of Wright, he was

free to call them as witnesses or read their depositions to
support his client's position, and thereafter argue that
significance to the jury.
4.

He chose to do neither.

When Wright testified on direct examination in his

case in chief, he was not asked, nor did he volunteer, the
detailed

conversations

moratorium,

elevated

concerning water.
Humphries1

concerning
coliform

the potential
levels

or

discussions

That information had to be obtained by

counsel on cross-examination

Wright to testify

building

and by requiring

from his previously given deposition.

Wright's "convenient memory" was always at issue.
5. What Wright may have known concerning problems with
the land and surrounding area may not have been limited to
what he was told by Schirra and Schwartz.

He had developed

land in that area before and knew of flooding that occurred
in the spring of 1982 that resulted in "Mustang Pond" at the
lower end of his remaining undeveloped land which included
the subject property.
6.

The statement that Wright may well have known more

than he disclosed to the jury was made in a post-trial
brief, not to the jury.

Counsel is not precluded

arguing, either to the jury

from

or to the Court, as to whether

a witness testified accurately and completely, particularly
since the credibility of the witnesses in this case was of
critical

importance.

Chad

Eskelsen

A7

testified

without

objection that Wright's reputation for truthfulness in St.
George

was

very

bad

(T.1009) .

Eskelson

was

a

former

employee of Wright.
7.
suggest

Fraud
that

is

a multi-faceted

arguing

the

principal

credibility

of

a

of

law.

To

witness

and

suggestinq that he did not disclose all the information he
knew in a fraud case (given Wright's ultimate admission that
he did not disclose iraterial facts) f and to imply that such
an approach creates a new standard

in the area of fraud,

simply ignores the proven facts in this case and the correct
application of law.

It is not an attempt to expand existing

principals.
The undersigned is personally offended by an accusation
of unethical behavior and to make that accusation to this
court makes it that much more offensive.

If Mr. Pendleton

has a serious complaint, he should lodge it with the office
of the Utah State Bar Counsel, not this court.
8.3

(See Rule

of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, effective

January 1, 1988).

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the jury verdict of fraud and
indemnification

and

also

reinstate

the

$15,000

Humphries for breach of the Management Agreement.

awarded

This

Court chould direct the trial court to totally

indemnify

Humphries

on

the

$30,000

promissory

direct the trial court to property calculate

note

and

pre-judgment

interest on all damages.
Finally, this Court should sustain the attorney's fees
awarded

at

trial,

and

award

additional

attorney's

fees

arising from this appeal.
DATED this

/yj^d

^

dav of March, 1989.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

HaAs Q. Chamberlain
ttorney for Defendants and
"Respondents
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/ ^ ^

'

da

Y

cf

March,

1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT

to Gary

W.

Pendleton, Attorney for Plaintiff, 150 North 200 East, Suite
202, St. George, Utah 84770.

Hans/Q. Chamberlain

ADDENDUM A

<*L /A/&C

A 6rczrr>£nt

^
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AGREEMENT FOR PLRuuAo^ v^r

njj^Jj

THIS AGREEMENT is entered into as of this
</

d^.^-f-^nrv^^rr

7

^r- -

day of

1935, by and between V.ESTS^EE I^*\3«.-^, a otan Limited

^

Partnersnip

(Sexier ] ,

ana its pr: nj^oa* genera*

HUMPHRIES, an individual of

\£2SH*;

'Utah/ ("ilumohr ies"

um\RZL

rrner

} ,and GEORGE

RONALD WRIGHT, an individual ("Buyer-11).

RECITALS Or FACT
A.

Seller

is

a

Utah

Limited

Partnership

business of operating a nursery in St. George, Utah.
Partnership

has also

improved

and maintained

in

the

the Limited

certain

leasehold

property used in connection with its business at 1425 West Sunset
Boulevard, St. George, Utah.
B.

Seller

and Humphries desire that Seller

sell, and

Buyer purchase, substantially all of the assets of Seller, except
the leasehold interest of Seller, as hereinafter detailed.
C.
ni>rsery

Humphries desires

business

at

the

to remain as the manager

presently

existing

location

of
under

the
a

management contract with Buyer, to which the parties have agreed
pursuant to a separate Employment Agreement related hereto.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the
mutual

covenants

contained

herein,

it

is

hereby

agreed and covenanted between the parties as follows:

represented,

1.
to

this

herein)

Subject of Sale.

Agreement
shall

The property tc be sold ;

(collectively

consist

of

referred

substantially

to

all

as
of

the
the

As

Seller/ including, without limitation:
(a)

All

of

presently

belonging

business

licenses

the

rights

to

the

nurse.ry ;

to Seller, rights of assigr
and

other

incancibles

thereto;
The right to use the trade ncr.e cf MV,<

(b)

Nursery" or any variation thereof, for the exciu
of Buyer;
(c)

All personal property belonging

pertaining

to

the

nursery

business

to Se
includ

inventory on the premises of Seller as cf the da
of, together with all tools, equipment, machiner
vehicles

and

ail appurtenances

thereto

as

mo:

detailed and scheduled on Exhibit A attached her
(d)

Accounts receivable held on the book

belonging to Seller.
In addition, it has been agreed

among the part

Seller shall continue to lease the premises but shall all
to operate

the business to whatever

extent it deems app

so long as the terms of the lease are not violated by sue
2.
pursuant

Terms

of

Sale.

Seller

will

sell

the

to this Agreement and Buyer hereby purchases th

for the amounts and payable for the following considerate
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(a)
estate

Buyer

shall deliver

located

described

on

in

Weber

the deeds

The original deeds

to Seller, certain

County,

attached

transferring

Utah,

hereto
title

real

specifically
as Exhibit

to the

B.

property

shall be executed and delivered as a part of -this Agreement:.

Buyer

warrants

that

title

thereto

is free

and

clear, subject to taxes which are unpaid and due for the
year 1935*^ In addition, Buyer shall provide at its own
expense a policy of title insurance covering

the value

of the land conveyed,
(b)

Buyer shall contract with Humphries to provide

management services on a contract basis as hereinafter
set forth in the Contract for Management Services which
is incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C*
(c)
incurred

Seller shall assume all debts and obligations
by

Agreement.

the

business

Seller

prior

represents

to

the

that

date

such

of

this

debts

and

obligations are fully described on the attached Exhibit

(d)

All

accounts

receivable

incurred

by

Seller

and/or Humphries in connection with the operation of the
business as described herein.

A list of such accounts

is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
(e)

Buyer

shall

not

assume

any

liabilities

obligations of Seller and Humphries, and Seller and
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or

Humphries hereby warrant and represent to Bayer n
of

them

shall have

creditors upon closing
Promissory i;ote

remaining obligations (

any

of th*s transaction, exce

to ZionKs tVxij:st

National Bank

J. AJJ'^t.uS

aruocnt of
by Cct3c

.

$ /S

CCC^*^

/<?t> c/*^«_t i

no t mo c e th»

^

,vr"<-t

^

-A

and^ . miscellaneous
trade accc
^
k

%*&*$^

$

l^rv DATC oJ-

vrwcJbt shall b

to be asSk

Buyer.
3.
hereunder

Trace tiumes.

By reason of the assignment t'

the right to use the name "nest Side Nursery"

derivative thereof, Seller agrees not to use sale names
names
engaged

similar

tnereto

in by Buyer.

in connection

with

any

other

b

Humphries makes the sams covenant

extent that Humphries, in the future, may engage in an
business.

Seller further agrees that it will change its

accordance

with

such

laws

in

order

to

avoid

any

pc

conflict with the business purchased by Buyer hereunder.
4.
diminishing

Sales

Taxes.

Seller

agrees

that,

the accounts receivable, it will pay all Uta

sales and use taxes due for all periods ending as
hereof.

of t

Buyer will be liable for all such taxes from ar

such date.
5.

Bulk Sales Compliance.

Seller agrees tha

any creditors of Seller who would not be paid in due cc
Buyer pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2(a) hereof, Seller ha
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obtained

waivers

l a w s of

the S t a t e

law,

and S e l l e r

of

the a p p l i c a t i o n

of
will

cf

Management

Services,

Humphries,

and

manager

the

St.

George,

Services
ana

obtain

as

:

of

termination.

with

Humphries,

shall

be

the

it

operation

the

has

agreec

perform

the

responsible

for

supporting

services,

in

the

Contract

C.

Furthermore,

the

Sunset

that

to

nursery

shall

may

be

business.

day-to-day

<~

as

r-

the

Management
both

c o v e :1 C .

Seller

L

X.

or

a

Humphries1

of

of B u y e r

contractual

Buyer
as

area

r

Boulevard,

for

termination

service

addition

employees

of

such

Contrac

^

agreed

paying

to

n c r i C O T , ? e l i t ior n
A?>^^
'
Jy"
\1

In

from

counsel

1425 West

geographical

is

its

at

s^. a f t e r

time

continued

forth

to

as Z x h i b i t

JI

covering

and

set

Buyer

agreed

business

VF/Or5

contract

employing

C,

has

a~reea

-TV< ' C C ^

i

Pursuant

hereto

nave

of

an e x e m p t i o n

the

paragarph.

Zxhibit

nursery

attached

of

this

Humphries

Utah,

rlumonries

>eriod

an o p i n i o n

Management.

of

t h e Bulk S a l e s A c t of

U t a h or c a n e s t a b l i s h

the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
6-

of

at

the

arrangements

be r e s p o n s i b l e

for

necessary

the

However,

supervision

of

for

Humphries
3uyer's

employees.
-La.

=r&-V

disa'bility of Buyer

within

rnp

a period

fivftnr

JOL

deat-h-

cf one vjB^jr^rrom the

date

hereof, Seller shall have the right^-to repurchase any and all of
the rights conveyed

hereunder

the propertj^^rTginally
r

for the then fair market value of

transferee by Buyer to Seller as of the

f buuli death o: gTa&b-irxity?—p"-^ fhe val_ue of any

oyyuL

• q * » sj u 11 'J L L

Agreement,

w>

with

(15%)

per

shall

be

Buyer

to Seller.

In

the

Crrm-JTtT-

interest

annum

curing

established

event

uOjuiuUu

accrued
the

bv

at

are

1- -

rate of

period.

cf

shall pay

parties

the

one-year

aooraisal

Seller

the

,£

C*

r

Fair^marke

the x:ost
mutual

of

transf

such

appraisers

perform

appraisal,

an

wiio
the

shall

thehv select

results of which

an

section,

disability

a:. s;
T^e

?^-P>rrn : rg

shall

mean

one

U—2.

rye

ro-)^

^Q—p;sv:s >on-

w

shall
appral

shall be

be the proper considerations for the repurchase.
this

app

agreement

findings of the appraiser hired^by^Seller, then ezch
additional

V

fifteen^

the orcoerty

not i n

» w wC

pres

?ocourp
hundred

right of^any member of Buyer's immediate family to take^
continue

the

business

in

the

place^of

Buv£-r^and

ass;

perform all of the Buyer's obligations^tlnder this Agreem
the

Contract For

Management Services,

Exhibit

C,

enteri

immediate famiiv^to continue the business must be^made in
to Seller^fi

thin Ten

(10)

days of

Seller's

S^y^TJ/uG eAbi.Li-ee—tr^e—fq^::rhB^ prnvi^inr.t; nf
'
19th

8.
day

Maintenance of Lease.

written

r£q

this sect-.ir

Buyer shall, on or bef

of each month, pay the amount due under Sellers

Agreement with James La Vae Smith, dated February 23/ 1985

-6-

ten percent

(10%).

Seller

shallmaintain

and keep the lease of

the premises paid up and current at all times.

In the event any

Notice of Default is delivered to Seller, Seller shall deliver a
copy of the same to Buyer and cure such default within Ten
days of such notice.

In the event Seller

(10)

fails to cure default

within Ten (10) days, Buyer may, at his discretion make the lease
payment

in

the

Seller's

stead

and

may,

at

his

discretion,

terminate the contract for Management services, Exhibit C.
9.
covenants

Representations

of

Seller,

and representations hereinabove

In

addition

stated, Seller

to

hereby

represents to Buyer as follows:
(a)

Seller

organized

is

a Utah

and existing

Utah with full power

under

Limited

Partnership

duly

the laws of the State of

to enter

into this Agreement

and

execute all documents pertaining hereto;
(b)
Partner

Seller has been duly authorized by its General
to

otherwise

sell
carry

substantially
out

the

terms

all
of

of

the Assets

and

this Agreement

and

perform its covenants hereunder; and
(c)

Seller has provided to Buyer ample opportunity

to inspect the Assets sold hereunder together* with

the

books of account and other documents and records pertaining

thereto, and has no knowledge of any material

obligations
would

or

contingent

liabilities

of Seller

which

impact-this Agreement and which have not already

been disclosed to Buyer or would be easily discoverable
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by an examination of the books and records of Sel

10.

General.
(a)

It is expressly understood that Buyer

no indebtedness or obligation of any nature prese
at any time in the future owed to any creditor bj
or

Humphries,

Agreement,

except

and

Agreement

or

construed

Buyer
any

to

as

expressly

disclaims

document

create

set

forth

any

intent

th

related

hereto

s!

benefits

for

any

othc

creditor.
(b)

This Agreement shall be governed by 1

of the State of Utah in its interpretation.
(c)

In

the event of any legal action brc

either party for the purpose of enforcing perfor
any covenant or representation hereunder or for
for

breach

thereof,

the

prevailing

party

s

entitled to recover from the breaching party at
fees and. costs as shall be determined by the Cou
(d)

In

the event any written notice is

under this Agreement, the parties shall agree t
either personal delivery or delivery by U.S. mai
class

postage

opposite

prepaid,

addressed

to

the

a

the signatures hereunder or any other

which either

party may subsequently confirm in

to the other.
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+x
this

wixitr*»p wtii-ic-ui:

Agreement

effective

#

as

tne

parties

nc^

Hereunto

of

the

and

year

cay

executed

first

written.

WESTSIDE NURSERY,
a Utah Liiuited P a r t n e r s h i o
3

y.

V

v.

a

Darrel Humphries, General Partner

D Ln-tLiZ* R I

/?

^ A A ^ E ^ - I M ^
D a r r e l Hurcohries

\\

BUYER:

—^

y

/Georgia R o n a l d

Al-20
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EXHIBIT "A"
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF SELLEF.

/9JLL "P<L/iu7 wareneU,5c<pp/tg±,
yQr- 7 ^ £

tiJeji-

Stcc

A/a

r$c

7

*vd prrjeo*/

ffirpficrtf

A.

EXHIBIT "E"
DEEDS TO OGDEN PROPERTY

EXHIBIT "Dn
SCHEDULE OF DE3TS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER

ADDENDUM B

CONTRACT FOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES

AGREE!1ENT mace between DARREL HUMPHRIES, of Veyc, Utah,
County of Washington, State of Utah, ("Contractor") and GEORGE
RONALD WRIGHT, whose principal place of business is located at
City

of

St.

George,

County

of- Washington,

State

of

Utah,

("Owner") .

RECITALS
1.

Owner

is engaged

in the business of operating a

plant nursery at wholesale and retail and related produces, and
maintains or will maintain an ongoing business in St, George,
County of Washington, State of Utah,
2.

Contractor has been engaged and ha^ had a great

deal of experience in the above-designated business.
3.

Contractor is willing to perform services and Owner

is willing to engage Contractor for management services cr. the
terms, covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth.
4.

Owner has pruchased the nursery from, among others,

Contractor himself as of the date hereof.
For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of
the mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, Owner
and Contractor agree as follows:

ftpp ? 5 1998

SECTION ONE
TERMS OF PERFORMANCE
Owner hereby engages Contractor as a manager oi
Side

Nursery

and

Contractor

hereby accepts and agree;

engagement, subject to the general supervision and pu
the orders, advice, and direction of Owner.
perform

such

holding ' such

other

duties as are customarily

position

in other, same, or

enterprises as that engaged in by Owner,
Contractor

Contrac

is an independent proprietor

perform*

similar

bu

It is under£
and not an em

Owner•
SECTION TWO
BEST EFFORTS OF CONTRACTOR
Contractor agrees that he will at all times f^:
industriously,

and

to the best of his ability, exper

talents, perform all of the duties that may be requir
from him pursuant to the express and implicit terms Y
the reasonable satisfaction of Owner.
SECTION THREE
TERM OF CONTRACT
The term of this Agreement shall be a period c
year,

commencing jrSrS^^^^^\

• SeotemtrgT

f

198 ^

as hereinafter provided.

Ap/

,

1985,

and

t€

^subject, however, to prior t«
At the expiration date this

may be renewed for periods of one year subject to negot:
further agreement between the parties.
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SECTION FOUR
COMPENSATION
Owner shall pay Contractor, and Contractor shall accept
from Owner, in full payment for Contractor! s ^Jryiic^s hereunder,
Thousand Dollars
yd p£r year, payable twice monthly as of the 1st
and

15th

day

J

of

each month

while

this Agreement

shall be in

force.
Owner
expenses

shall

incurred

reimburse

by

Contractor

Contractor

while

for

all

traveling

necessary

pursuant

to

Owner ! s directions,
SECTION FIVE
TERMINATION DUE TO DISCONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS
Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding,

in

the

event

that Owner

shall discontinue

operating

its

business at St. George, State of Utah, then this Agreement shall
terminate as of the last day of the month on which Owner ceases
operations at such location with the same force and effect as if
such last day of the month were originally set as the termination
date hereof.
' SECTION SIX
OTHER TIME OBLIGATIONS
Contractor
attention,
interest

shall devote substantially all of his time,

knowledge,

and

skills

of Owner, and Owner

solely

to

the

shall be entitled

business

and

to all of the

benefits, profits or other issues arising from or incident to all
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work, services, and advice of Contractor, and Contract
not,

during

the

terra

hereof,

serve

as

officer,

c

employee, or in any other capacity in any ether business
to Owner's business or any allied trade; provided, howe*
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or ]
right

of

Contractor

to manage personal

and

family in\

that do not compete with Ownerfs business,
SECTION SEVEN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS
Contractor shall make available to employer all
ticn of which Contractor shall have any knowledge and sh
all suggestions and recommendations that will be of muti
fit to Owner and himself.
SECTION EIGHT
TRADE SECRETS '
Contractor
either

shall

not

at

any

time

or

in

any

directly or indirectly, divulge, disclose or con

to any person, firm or corporation in any manner whatsc
information concerning any matters affecting or relatin
business of Owner, including without limiting the gener
the foregoing, any of its customers, the prices it obtair
obtained from the sale of, or at which it sells or has £
products, source of supply, or any other

information cc

the business of Owner, its manner of operation, its pla
cesses, or other data without regard to whether all of t
going

matters will be deemed confidential, material, o
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tant, the parties hereto stipulating that as between them, the
same are important, material, and confidential and gravely affedt
the effective and successful conduct of the business of Owner,
and Owner's good will, and that any breach of the terms of this
paragraph shall be a material breach of this Agreement,
SECTION NINE
AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT
This contract contains the complete agreement concerning
the arrangement between the parties and shall, as of the effective date hereof, supersede
parties.

all other agreements

between the

However, this contract shall be consistent with a Pur-

chase cf Assets Agreement of even date herewith.

The parties

stipulate that neither of them has made any representation with
respect to the subject matter cf this Agreement or any representations including the execution and delivery hereof except such
representations as are specifically set forth herein and each of
the parties hereto acknowledges that he or it has relied on its
own judgment in entering into this Agreement.

The parties hereto

further acknowledge that any payments oS representations that may
have heretofore been made by either cf them to* the other are of
no effect and that neither of them has relied thereon in connection with his or its dealings with the other.
SECTION TEN
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
No waiver or modification of this Agreement or of any
covenant, condition, or

limitation

-5-

herein contained

shall be

valid unless in writing and duly executed by the p
charged therewith and no evidence of any proceeding, a:
cr

litigation

affecting

between

the

parties

hereto arising

this Agreement, or the rights or obligati*

parties hereunder, unless such waiver or modification :
inc, duly executed as aforesaid, and the parties fur
that the provisions of this section may not be waived
herein set forth.
SECTION ELEVEN
TERMINATION
In the event of any violation by Contractor
the terms of this contract, Owner thereon may term
Management Agreement without notice and with pay only t
of such -termination.

It is further agreed that any

evasion of any of the terms of this contract by eU
hereto will result in immediate and irreparable inju
other

party

and will authorize recourse to injuncti

specific performance as well as to all other legal or
remedies to which such injured party may be entitled he
SECTION TWELVE
NONCOMPETITION COVENANT
Upon

termination of

this contract for causi

expiration hereof by its Jtodrms //Contractor
period of ^r^^_-j=giw ^^r

agrees t

<J p\ f f-Y r the date of such term:

shall not compete with the nursery, gardening sales an<
sales, related business of Owner by serving in any

-6-

proprietorship, partnership/

corporation or otherwise,

States of Utah, Nevada, Oregon or Arizona.

in the

Contractor acknow-

ledges that the restrictions above stated are reasonable.

It is

agreed between the parties that the consideration for the noncompetition covenant is the Agreement for Partial Purchase cf
Assets executed on the same date hereof, pursuant to which Owner
purchased the personal property assets of West Side Nursery, the
former business owned by Contractor in his capacity as General
Partner.
SECTION THIRTEEN
SEVERABILITY
All agreements and covenants contained herein are severable, and in the event any of them shall be held to be invalid by
any competent court, this contract shall be interpreted

as if

such invalid agreements or covenants were not contained herein.
SECTION FOURTEEN
CHOICE OF LAW
It is the intention of the parties hereto that this
Agreement and the performance hereunder and all suits and special
proceedings hereunder be construed in accordance with and under
and pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto executed
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this

contract

effective

a s of -SHnfgsSer

, 1985.

OWNER:

George/Ronald

Wright

/
CONTRACTOR:

Darrel Humphries^

Al-21
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ADDENDUM C

December 10, 1985
Certified Mail - Return
Receipt Requested

Mr.
138
The
St.

George Ronald Wright
S. Valley View Dr.,
Park - Green Valley
George, Utah
84770
RE:

Westside Nursery

Dear Mr. Wright:
Please be advised that I represent Darrel Humphries of St.
George, Utah, concerning the business relationship the two of you
have established over the past few months.
As you know, Mr. Humphries has been advised that the
property you traded to him located in Ogden, Utah is basically
worthless at the present time, and we should have in our
possession appraisals that will substantiate this position within
the next couple of days. Because the property does not have the
value you represented, to-wit, $90,000, it is Mr. Humphries'
position as follows:
1. That he be paid the sum of $60,0 00 cash upon
receipt of this letter, or that you obtain an appraisal
from an MIA appraiser that the property does in fact have
a value of $90,000.
2. That the note owed to Zions First National Bank
in the sum of $15,000 be paid by you immediately.
3. That you deposit such funds as may be necessary
to cover the overdraft in the business account of
approximately $11,000 to $12,000.
4. That Mr. Humphries retain both the 1984 Ford
3/4 ton 4-wheel drive pickup and the 1983 Mercury, with
Mr. Humphries to assume and pay all encumbrances thereon.
5. That if you comply with the above, Mr. Humphries
will agree to stay on at the nursery as long as you want
him to at the same salary he currently receives and he
will train all personnel you desire.

i DEFENDANT'S
1
EXHIBIT

Mr. George Ronald Wright
December 10, 1985
Page 2
Re:

Westside Nursery

If you choose not to perform as set forth above, then Mr.
Humphries would request the following:
1. That you return the nursery, together with all
inventory and other personal property to him.
2. That you pay to Mr. Humphries the sum of $4,000
he has incurred in labor costs, together with the sum of
$2,000 he has incurred in heating the nursery during the
interim period, for a total of $6,000, and to pay that
amount at the time the nursery is returned.
3. That you provide him with all documentation
necessary so he can establish what merchandise has been
ordered, and to reject merchandise he may not elect to
retain.
Mr. Humprhies is hopeful that this matter can be resolved
short of litigation. However, because of the critical time of
the year and the need to plan and plant for the spring season, we
must request a decision from you within five (5) days from
receipt of this letter. If we do not hear from you within that
time frame, we will assume that any offer to settle this matter
short of litigation has been rejected and will proceed
accordingly.
So there is no misunderstanding concerning this matter,
this letter is also to serve notice that Mr. Humphries elects to
rescind the purported Agreement for Purchase of Assets and the
contract for management services based upon his recently acquired
knowledge concerning the value of the property you traded to him
in exchange for the business known as the Westside Nursery.
Please direct all correspondence or other communication to
my office as set forth above.
Yours very truly,
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

Hans Q. Chamberlain

HQC/db

ADDENDUM D

CHAMBERLAIN & H I G B E E
ATTORNEYS
H A N S Q. C H A M B E R L A I N
T H O M A S M. H I G B E E
FLOYO W HOLM

P. O . B O X
250

SOUTH

AT

LAW

726

AREA CODE S O I
TELEPHONE 5 8 6 - 4 4 0 4

MAIN

CEDAR CITY, UTAH 8 4 7 2 0

December 18, 19 85

Mr. George Ronald Wright
1021 S. Valley View Dr., #138
The Park - Green Valley
St. George, Utah
84770
RE:

Westside Nursery

Dear Mr. Wright:
I enclose herewith a copy of my letter to you dated
December 10th, 1985, that was sent certified mail - return
receipt requested. It appears that you have intentionally failed
to receipt for this letter and I am therefore having you served
personally with a copy of the same. However, all offers to
settle this matter set forth in said letter are hereby revoked.
Mr. Humphries is willing, however, to discuss a cash settlement
if you still desire to purchase the Westside Nursery.
We now have in our possession an appraisal which indicates
that the property you have deeded to Mr. and Mrs. Humphries has a
present value of $35,000, and not the value of $90,000 that you
represented it had. In addition, we have clear evidence that you
met with Mr. Graham Shirra of the Weber Planning Commission 3 to
4 months prior to the sewer moratorium and that you were advised
that a moratorium would be placed on the subject property many
months prior to the time it was enacted on October 15th, 1985.
The fact that you deeded the subject property to Mr. and Mrs.
Humphries some 11 days prior to the moratorium becoming effective
gives rise to other speculation as to the timeliness of that
transaction.
It is therefore the position of Mr. Humphries that the
purported Sales Agreement dated October 4th, 1985, between
Westside Nursery, a Utah limited partnership, as seller and
yourself as buyer, and the Contract for Management Services of
the same date, are hereby cancelled and rescinded on the basis
that the seller therein, Westside Nursery, did not receive
property having a value you represented it to have, to-wit,
$90,000, that the property cannot be developed because of a
building moratorium placed upon the property, and for other
misrepresentations which will not be detailed at this time.

2 DEFENDANT'S
"* EXHIBIT

±2SL

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGL
A T T O R N E Y S AT

E

LAW

Mr. George R. Wright
December 18, 1985
Page 2
Re:

Westside Nursery

Enclosed herewith are copies of deeds that I have prepared
wherein Darrel Eugene Humpries and Karen Ann Humpries, his wife,
deed back the property located in Weber County, Utah, you
previously deeded to them by deed dated October 4th, 1985. These
deeds should be recorded in Weber County by you upon receipt. By
reason of the same, it is the position of Mr. Humphries and
Westside Nursery that said business is still owned by Westside
Nursery, a Utah limited partnership, and that in an attempt to
restore the parties to their positions prior to the purported
sale on October 4th, 1985, that the following terms shall
control:
1. That since Mr. and Mrs. Humphries have deeded
back the real property conveyed by you to them, that you
likewise release in writing any interest you had in the
business known as Westside Nursery so that there is no
misunderstanding as to the status of this matter. In that
connection, I enclose an Agreement that I would ask you to
sign before a notary public and return the same to my
office in the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope.
This agreement has already been signed by my clients.
2. That you remove, within five (5) days from
receipt of this letter, all of the furniture, selfwatering containers, brass, copper and ceramic items you
purchased and had delivered to the premises. The removal
of these items should take place in the presence of Mr.
Humphries.
3. Because the eucalyptus trees purchased by you are
fragile and cannot be simply moved outdoors, Mr. Humphries
is agreeable to resolve this particular item on one of the
following bases:
A. That you sell the eucalyptus trees to Mr.
Humphries at the original price you purchased them
for. Upon documented proof that the trees have in
fact been paid for (i.e., a copy of your cancelled
check, charge card receipt or other proof of
payment), a cashier's check will be delivered to you
in that amount.
B. That if you want to retain ownership of the
trees until you can relocate them to another nursery
or place of your choosing, that you pay to Westside

/

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBI
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW

Mr. George R. Wright
December 18, 1985
Page 3
Re:

Westside Nursery

Nursery the sum of $2.50 per month per treef payment
to be made in advance for six (6) months, to-wit, for
October, November, and December, last past, and for
January,. February and March, in the future. The
number of trees can be determined by a mutual count
to be conducted by yourself and Mr. Humphries or
someone else if you determine that would be most
appropriate.
C. That if number A or B above are not
acceptable, that you immediately remove the trees
from the premises and reimburse Mr. Humphries for
expenses incurred to date in caring for the trees in
the form of labor, soil, greenhouse expenses, and
containers, at the rate of $2.00 per tree times the
total number of trees located in the greenhouse. If
you elect to accept this alternative, the trees must
be removed within five (5) days, since Mr. Humphries
simply must have the greenhouse space to commence the
planting for the springtime season in St. George
which is approximately 6 to 8 weeks away. Time is
extremely critical and Mr. Humphries cannot wait
beyond this five (5) day period to commence planting;
he simply must do that immediately.
4. In the event you simply fail to do nothing in
response to the requests outlined above, Mr. Humphries
will assume ownership of all growing materials you have
purchased and caused to be placed upon the subject
property and pay for the same, be it yourself or the
actual supplier of the product. Everything else that you
purchased and caused to be delivered to the nursery will
be delivered to your driveway five (5) days after you are
served with this document.
On behalf of Mr. Humphries, this letter constitutes an
offer to reconvey any property obtained from you under both
contracts dated October 4th, 1985, to you and to restore
everything of value which was received from you, and to surrender
the possession of the property you deeded located in Weber
County, Utah, and to do and perform all acts and things which
might be necessary or proper in order to fully and immediately
restore to you all of the properties and things of value received

i

CHAMBERLAIN & H I G B ^ £
ATTORNEYS

AT

LAW

Mr. George R. Wright
December 18, 1985
Page 4
Re:

Westside Nursery

from you, as fully and completely as if said contracts had never
been made.
Please govern yourself accordingly.
Yours very truly,
CHAMBERJ/XlN & HIGBEE /")

fans Q. Chamberlain
HQC/db
enclosures
xc:

Mr. Darrel E. Humphries

ADDENDUM E

ASSETSCASH IN 21DNS 1ST NAT'L
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
INVENTORY
CURRENT ASSETS
FIXED ASSETS
AUTO AND TRUCKS
AUTO *: TRUCKS DEPRECIAT
EQUIPMENT AND FIXTURES
EQUIP & FIXTURE DEPREC..
LEASE IMPROVEMENTS
LEASE IMPROVEMENT DEPRECI

C- , O wJ * J 4 'J J

60,000.00
- V *—r w

:

1

;J -

tr \—' •

/ •

X

2O 4 u O u

0. O 0

o , •_.

0, 00

FIXED ASSETS
TGTAL ASSETS
Total

Assets

$112,042.74

Liabi1i ties
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
NOTES PAYABLE OVER 1 YR.
SALES TAX PAYABLE
NOTES PAYABLE ZIONS BANK
NOTES PAYABLE 4*2 ZIONS
TRUCK PAYMENTS BALANCE
CURRENT LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
CAPTIAL ACCOUNT
CAPITAL VALUE
CURRENT EARNINGS
RETAINED EARNINGS

$0. 00
0- 00
1,641.55
7,319.73
0 - 00
$16,506.6;

$95,536.11
0. 00
O. 00

CAPITAL ACCOUNT
TOTAL LIABILITIES
Total LIab i1i t ias

112.042.74

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
/ n

ADDENDUM F

RESCLOTIOK OF THE BOARD OF COOKTT COMMISSIONERS
OF WEBER COONTY, UTAH

'._'

~''^
M*J-

IK
WHEREAS, the p u b l i c health and welfare concerns of c i t i z e n s of Veber
iunty d i c t a t e t h a t i t i s accessary to impose a l i m i t e d moratorium on
velopcient of any property l o c a t e d w i t h i n the boundaries of the Uintah
ghlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t •
NOV, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the authority of
e Veber County Commission granted under Utah Code Annotated S e c t i o n s 1 7 - 5 - 3 5 ,
- 5 - 4 Q , and 1 7 - 5 - 7 7 ,

that a l i m i t e d moratorium on the development of any

c p e r t y l o c a t e d w i t h i n the boundaries of the Dintah Highlands Water'and Sewer
provement D i s t r i c t i s hereby implemented under the following terms u n t i l an
equate,

approved p u b l i c sewer system has been constructed and i s o p e r a t i o n a l :

„ , y.

1 . ) As of the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s moratorium, no new s u b d i v i s i o n s in

-r}

e Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t w i l l be approved.
i 2^) Any proposed e x c e p t i o n to paragraph 1 must be approved by the Weber
unty Commission and be substantiated by a w r i t t e n statement from the
berN-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department that the s u b d i v i s i o n i s l o c a t e d i n an
ea where i t s development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate, d e p r e c i a t e , or i n
Y manner have a n e g a t i v e impact on present s o i l , groundwater, surface water,
d r a i n a g e c o n d i t i o n s i n the Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement
strict.
3*

Prior t o t h e development of any individual l o t , including those

sated i n e x i s t i n g s u b d i v i s i o n , the developer must f i r s t obtain w r i t t e n
proval from the Weber-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department to ensure t h a t :
a.

A currehtTcomprehensive soULajaod groundwater e v a l u a t i o n has been
*=

ie of t h e s i t e ;

*}

1Qn -

APR 2 5 t9B»
Z DEFENDANT'S
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b.

Soil and groundwater conditions are in f u l l compliance with a l l

s t a t e and l o c a l r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s , codes and ordinances pertaining to
i n d i v i d u a l wastewater disposal systems; and
c.

The proposed development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate,

d e p r e c i a t e , or in any manner have a negative impact on present s o i l ,
groundwater, surface water or drainage conditions in the Dintah Highlands Wati
and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t .
d.

I t i s c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t these l o t s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d and approv

or r e j e c t e d on an i n d i v i d u a l ,

case-by-case basis.

I n t h e o p i n i o n of t h e Weber County Board of Commissioners, i t s

is

n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h i s p o l i c y go i n t o e f f e c t immediately upon p u b l i c a t i o n i n ord
t o p r e s e r v e t h e h e a l t h of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of Weber County.
PASSED AND ADOPTED by t h e Board of County Commissioners of Weber County,
Otah a t a r e g u l a r m e e t i n g t h e r e o f held on t h e

/ ^

day of

OcZci^c^

1985.
BOARD OF.WJ^feR COUNTY 13#&ISSI0NERS

ATTEST:
RICHARD GREENE

4L
DEPUTY CLERK

^

(J

,

ADDENDUM G

COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE

ISSUED BY

Security Title Company
205 - 26TH STREET • OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)627-1320

George R. Wright
St. George Utah

Order No:

5869*+

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, herein called the Company, for valuable consideration,
hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or
referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules
A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy
or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance
of this Commitment or by subsequent indorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies
committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault
of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Commitment to be signed and sealed, to become valid when
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment
is effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date."

hOPm 1756-A
Commitment, Schedule A

SCHEDULE A

1.

Effective Date: O c t o b e r

2.

Policy or Policies to be issued:
(a)

E

1 , 1985 @ 7 : 5 5 a . m .

ALTA Owner's Policy

Commitment Mo:

58694

Amount
F o r

amount To Be D e t e r m i n e d

$TBD

Proposed Insured:
(b)

•

ALTA Loan Policy

$

Proposed Insured:

(0 •
3.

$

The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein is fee simple and
title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in:

GEORGE R. WRIGHT
4.

The land referred to in this commitment is

PARCEL 1: (Serial No. Q7-086-G007)
A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U. 5. Survey:
Beginning at the Southwest Quarter
corner of the Northeast Quarter of said Northwest Quarter of said Section; thence
Northeasterly 130 feet more or less, along the South line of the Cory Combe
property,
to a point 33 feet perpendicularly
distant Southwesterly from the
centerline of Combe Road; thence Southeasterly 130 feet, more or less along the
Southwesterly line of Combe Road to a Point on the l/16th Section line; thence West
205 feet, more or less, along said 1/16 Section line to the point of beginning.
PARCEL 2: (Serial No. pt 07-086-0003)
A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. U. S. Survey: Beginning at the most Easterly corner of
Lot 55, Uintah Highlands Subdivision No. 4, in Weber County, Utah; and running
thence along the Northeasterly boundary of said Subdivision the following four (4)
courses: North 67°47f50" West 117.54 feet; North 4U47' West 104.12 feet; North
74°41'57" West 109.40 feet; and North 23°20' West 324.03 feet; more or less to the
North line of the Southwest Quarter of said Northwest Quarter; thence East 255 feet
more or less to a point 33 feet perpendicularly distance Southwesterly from the
centerline of Combe Road; thence Southeasterly 178 feet, more or less, along the
Southwesterly line of Combe Road; thence Southwesterly 455 feet more or less to
the point of beginning.

• u n . i . x / J W - JQ<. \ n c v u c u JUiy,

iv/Z)

Commitment, Schedule B-2

SCHEDULE B - Section 2
Exceptions

No. 58694

The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to the
satisfaction of the Company.
1.

Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records.

2.

Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.

3.

Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.

4.

Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records.

5.

Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof;
water rights, claims or title to water.

6.

Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law
and not shown by the public records.

7.

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed insured acquires
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this commitment.

8.

Taxes for the year 1985, payable but not delinquent. (Serial No. 07-086-0007 and
part of 07-086-0003).

9.

Any charges and/or assessments that may be levied by the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District, the Uintah-Highland Water and Sewer Improvement District,
the Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, and the Weber County Fire
Protection Service Area #4.

10. The right to construct, operate, and maintain its line of telephone and telegraph
over and across the West half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township
5 North, Range 1 West, (exact location not disclosed), as conveyed to Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, by Instrument recorded November 1,
1918 in Book N, Page 176 of Records.
11.

Rights of Way for roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines, if any, now
existing over and across said property.
CONTINUED

Exceptions numbered

! L _ Z _ _ are hereby omitted.

SCHEDULE "B" CONTINUED

12. A Perpetual Easement to construct, reconstruct, operate, repair, replace and
maintain a culinary water line over and across Parcel 1 as follows: A 15 foot
wide permanent easement, 10 feet on the West side and 5 feet on the East side
of the following described centerline:
A part of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S.
Survey: Beginning at a point on the subdivision boundary of Uintah-Highlands
Subdivision No. 4, Weber County, Utah, being South 74°41'57" East 12.80 feet
from the Southeast corner of Lot 49 in said Subdivision; running thence North
23°20' West 206.71 feet; thence North 0°04'30" West 451.10 feet to the North
line of the Grantors property in Combe Road, as conveyed to UINTAH-HIGHLAND
WATER AND SEWER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, by Instrument recorded January
15, 1981 in Book 1374, Page 1660 of Records.
13.

Application for Assessment and Taxation of the subject property as Agricultural
Land recorded December 23, 1975 in Book 1109, Page 477 of Records. Said
Application contains a five year rollback provision which becomes effective upon
change in use of all or part of the subject property.

14.

Special Assessments in favor of UINTAH-HIGHLAND WATER AND SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, as set forth in Instrument recorded January 18, 1985
in Book 1461, Page 17 of Records.

15.

Delinquent taxes for the years 1981, 1983 and 1984 in the total
$398.06 as to Serial No. 07-086-0007.
*

*

amount of

*

1985 taxes are $158.54 including $000 personal property valuation
as to Serial No. 07-086-0007 and taxes for Serial No. 07-086-0003 are not segregated.

COMMITMENT
Conditions and Stipulations

1.

The term "mortgage," when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument.

2.

If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other
matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown
in Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be
relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company
is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to
the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance,
adverse claim or other matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly,
but such amendment shall not relieve the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of
these Conditions and Stipulations.

3.

Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties
included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss
incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to
eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate of interest or mortgage thereon
covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the
policy or policies committed for and such liability is subject to the Insuring provisions, exclusion from coverage,
and the Conditions and Stipulations of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed
Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment except as expressly
modified herein.

4.

Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which arises out of the status of the title
to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage covered hereby or any action asserting such claim,
shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipulations of this Commitment.
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ADDENDUM I

":JRT
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1
2
3

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN [0607]
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendants
250 South Main
P. 0. Box 726
Telephone:

A

(801)

(

1

—

DE"'JV .

n

r

Pii 1 0 5
f—

>' '

586-4404

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

vs .
10
11

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

12

Civil No. 85-0536

Defendants.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial pursuant to
notice duly given on April 25th, 1988, in the Washington County
Courthouse before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court
Judge presiding.

and his counsel, Gary Pendleton.

i AT LAW
TH MAIN
DX 726

Also present was Defendant

Darrel Humphries, general partner in Westside Nursery, a Utah
limited partnership and Darrel Humphries, an individual, and
their counsel, Hans Q. Chamberlain.
This matter has been the subject of prior orders which are
affirmed in this Judgment.
1.

These orders include:

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause

dated December 23rd, 1985.
2.

ERLAIN
5BEE

Present were Plaintiff George Ronald Wright,

Temporary Restraining Order; Order Appointing Receiver?

Judgment; and Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment
25th, 1986.
3.

Findings of Fact and Temporary Order dated

4.

Findings and Order dated November 10th, 1986

1986.

The jury was empaneled and the parties proceed*
opening statements.
his case.

Plaintiff proceeded with the pre

Plaintiff rested.

Defendants

thereafter

their case.
After the Defendants rested their case pursuani
counterclaim, Plaintiff moved for a dismissal or dire
against Defendants' counterclaim alleging fraud.

Af

said argument, the same was denied by the Court.
Following the order of the Court entered denying
motion

to dismiss, the jury was called in and ins

Arguments were made, and the matter was duly submit*
jury.

The jury returned a verdict as follows:

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
V7ASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,
Defendants.

Civil No. 85-053

We the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter,
findf by the agreement of at least six of our number:
1.

Did Defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements

between the parties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the
agreements?
YES
2.

X

NO

If your answer to No, 1 is Yes, what damages should be

awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wright as a result of the
breach?
S
3.

6,805.00

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements

between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrel Humphries as
an employee under the Management Agreement?
YES
4.

X

NO

If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be

awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach?
$ 15,000.00
5.

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements

in any other respect?
6.

YES

X

NO

If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should be the

amount of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a
result of that breach?
7.

$

0

Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of

the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF

X

DEFENDANT

8.

Under the agreements, who was to pay the

payable in excess of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985?
PLAINTIFF
9.

DEF

Under the agreements, who was to receive tt

receivable owed tc Westside Nursery as of October 4,
PLAINTIFF
10.

X

DEF

Under the terms of the agreements, between P

Defendant

Darrel

Humphries, who

is

obligated

to j

Promissory Note in favor cf Zions First National Ban*
of $15,00C, plus accrued interest dated January 3, 19
PLAINTIFF
11.

DEF

As betw7een Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Hu

is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of
National Bank in the sum of $30,000, plus accrued int
December 198 5?
PLAINTIFF
12.

DEF

Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make f

misrepresentations

concerning

property to Defendants?
13.

X

the value of the Web<
YES

X

If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, wh

damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Ni:
Darrel Humphries for the difference in the actual f
value of the land in Weber County and the misrepreser
that land?
14.

$ 38,582.00

What is the amount of attorney's fee, if

should be awarded to:

PLAINTIFF GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT
1

DEFENDANTS WESTSIDE NURSERY and

2

DARREL HUMPHRIES

$ 10,000.00

3
4

THE ABOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY.
DATED this 30th day of April, 1988.

/s/ Clayton Prince
Foreperson

8
9
10

DISSENTING JURORS

11
12
13
14
15

Ey each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors
dissenting from that answer:
ANSWER
NUMBER

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ERLAIN
SBEE
S AT LAW
T H MAIN
ir»v -»»«

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

NAMES OF JURORS DISSENTING

11.
1

12.

2

13.

3

14.

Vondell L. Barrick, Evon R. Seely

4
The Court ir.ade some inquiry of the jury concerni
findings.

Neither counsel requested that the jury

after returning the verdict and the jury was then exc
NOV;, THEREFORE, based upon the findings of the japplicable principles of law,
10

||

11

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as fo
1.

Defendant Humphries shall have and recover

12

Plaintiff Judgment

13

follows:

14

A.
||

16
17

in the amount of $20,198.21

com

Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in th

$37,305.21 as reimbursement for funds borrowed
First National Bank and deposited directly into
Nursery checking account.

Against this sum, PI

18

entitled

19

reimbursement

20

Humphries from the Westside Nursery account for

21

of personal obligations and $6,772.00 as reimbu

22

funds withdrawn

23

October 4th, 1985, for the purpose of paying ac<

24

should have been assumed and discharged by Defei

25

amounts specified herein constituting Plaintiff

to

setoffs
for

in

monies

the

amount

of

misappropriated

$6,805
by I

from the Westside Nursery accc

setoff also includes interest which has been calculated at

1

the legal rate on the above-mentioned items from the date of

2

the misappropriation or expenditure.

3

2.

A

Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded

Judgment against Plaintiff for the difference in the actual fair
market value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented
value cf said land in the sum of $38,582.00.

The damages awarded

by the jury were calculated by the jury based on a fraudulent
8

misrepresentation concerning the value of the Weber property to

9

be $90,000.00, less the sum of $54,700.00 and less the real

10

estate commission Westside Nursery and Humphries had to pay in

11

selling the property of $3,282.00, thus totaling a difference of

12

$38,582.00.

13

twelve percent

14

will not award interest to Defendants on the sum of $38,582.00

15

from and after October 4th, 1985 until time of Judgment, even

16

though requested to do so by Defendants.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ERLAIN
;BEE
i AT LAW
m
MAIN
OX 7 2 6

3.

Said Judgment shall bear interest at the rate of
(12%) per annum until paid in full.

The Court

Plaintiff is not contractually bound to assume or

indemnify Defendant Humphries against any obligation in favor of
Zions First National Bank arising out of the execution of a
certain Promissory Note dated January 3rd, 1985.
4.

Defendants

are obligated to pay and discharge all

accounts payable as of October 4th, 1985, to the extent that said
accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000.00 and are further obligated
to pay all outstanding tax obligations, federal, state or local,
accruing on or before October 4th, 1985.

5.

Even though the jury found that Plaintiff br<

1

agreements between the parties by terminating Defendan-

2

as an employee under

3

Humphries damages in the sum of $15,000.00 by reason o

the Management Agreement

and

the Court concludes and orders that Defendant Humphri
for wrongful termination of the Management Agreement i
with prejudice, the jury!s findings regarding specific
fact establishing the defense of justification as a i
law.
6.

Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries ar

10

Judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 a

11

attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this ac

12

7.

13

awarded

14

$68,780.21, said Judgment to bear interest at the rate

15

percent (12%) per annum until paid in full.

16

Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery arc
a total Judgment

DATED this

V

—

against Plaintiff

day of

in the

( x ^ ^ ^ ^ i

T

17
18

J/ PHILIP EV^S
District Court Judg

19
20
21
22
23

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

VAiiC&cn iL

24

HAMBERLAir
& HIGBEE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
aSO SOUTH MAIN

H,XNS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
ttorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
3

correct copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT
to Mr, Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney at Law, 150 North Second East,
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage prepaid,
on this 5th day of August, 1988.
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3ERLAIN
IGBEE
ITS AT LAW
UTH MAIN
BOX 7 2 6

£dcretary ,.

ADDENDUM J

i

^DEFENDANT'S
^EXHIBIT I f

